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HELP WANTED: IS THERE A BETTER WAY TO
SELECT JUDGES?
Luke Bierman*

Fights over the courts, and how to select our judges, have been
with us since our nation’s birth.1 The Declaration of Independence
charged King George with making colonial judges dependent on
him alone.2 There were great debates in the Constitutional Convention and during the ratification process about how to select
judges.3 The Jacksonian Period saw a marked trend toward electing judges,4 with the subsequent Progressive Era beginning a
movement back toward appointment.5 More recently, concerns
about judicial elections, which range from judges raising increasingly large amounts of campaign money to the ethical problems
associated with conducting campaigns, have prompted a variety of
organizations including the League of Women Voters, the American Bar Association, and state-based reform advocacy groups to
reconsider how best to improve judicial selection.6 As the debate
over the role of America’s courts becomes increasingly shrill and

* Fellow in Government Law and Policy, Albany Law School, Government Law
Center. B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Marshall Wythe School of Law of the College
of William and Mary in Virginia; M.A., Ph.D., State University of New York at Albany. The views expressed in this article are those of only the author.
1. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2 (2006) (“Bouts of courtdirected animus have come and gone at generational intervals since the founding of
the nation.”).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
3. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
4. Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 345, 345.
5. See MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 33-61 (1992).
6. See G. Alan Tarr, Politicizing the Process: The New Politics of State Judicial
Elections, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA
(Keith J. Bybee ed., forthcoming 2007) (on file with the author). The Justice at Stake
Campaign (of which I am a member of the Board of Directors) has organized almost
fifty national and state organizations interested in supporting judicial independence
with judicial selection reform as a primary issue of concern. See Justice at Stake
Home Page, http://www.justiceatstake.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
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partisan,7 the need for creative approaches to placing judges on the
bench increases.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The morning of April 30, 2006, dawned unlike many in upstate
New York. For one thing, it was brilliantly sunny with the promise
of turning comfortably warm, a rare occurrence during the upstate
spring. For another, it was my birthday, the annual reminder of not
getting any younger. Finally, the classified job postings in the Albany Times-Union included an advertisement for a Justice of the
New York Supreme Court, Third Judicial District. Of these three
things, the latter was the most extraordinary in my estimation.
Judges are not usually recruited in the want ads, along with pipefitters and mental health workers, drivers and chefs. Was New York,
facing a crisis in its judicial selection system, up to something creative, interesting, and new in judicial selection?
The judicial want ad attracted my attention for several reasons.
First, I was considering the job market in upstate New York, a region I have come to love and call home. Of course, upstate suffers
many challenges including harsh weather, a stagnant economy, and
diminishing numbers of young adults, none of which seem to offset
its beauty, comfortable pace of life, affordable housing, and accessibility to the population centers and attractions of the Canadian
and American Northeast. There are not many opportunities in upstate New York that compare to the senior-level law and policy
research, teaching, and advocacy that I have been doing for the last
decade. Second, I had spent a fair amount of time working with
judges and the courts in upstate New York, clerking for two Appellate Division justices in the Third Department, where I also served
as the court’s Chief Attorney. Having also practiced in an upstate
law firm and taught about law and policy, I know a little something
about New York law, including not just the details and intricacies
but also the big picture. I also know enough about the politics of
New York to know the realities of how people generally become
judges, something that a recent lawsuit brought to the public eye in
7. See John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at Georgetown University Law Center and the American Law Institute’s Conference on
the State of the Judiciary: Fair and Independent Courts (Sept. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/CoJ092906-roberts.pdf; see also
DEBORAH GOLDBERG, CRAIG HOLMAN & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000, at 6 (2002), available at
http://faircourts.org/files/JASMoneyReport.PDF (judicial elections have become
“nastier, noisier, and costlier”).
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a dramatic way—the legal challenge to New York’s convention system of choosing candidates had been successful.8 Third, I had
spent the past dozen or so years working on so-called judicial selection reform, helping craft an effort to reinvigorate merit selection
of judges by looking at the weaknesses of electing judges and proposing some creative ways to select judges.
With these things in mind, I considered the want ad. I knew that
the ad was for an interim appointment authorized by the state constitution and made necessary because Justice Thomas Spargo had
been removed from the bench by a ruling of the State Commission
on Judicial Nomination.9 Anyone appointed would serve only until
an election was held to fill the full fourteen-year term of a Justice
of the Supreme Court, an appointment lasting most likely only a
matter of months.10 I knew that if practice followed custom, Governor Pataki would appoint a loyal Republican lawyer who would
run for election with cross endorsements from the major political
parties after some agreements among party leaders about who
would become Justices of the Supreme Court from within the Third
District.11 Of course, Pataki’s lame duck status could well affect
the prevailing patterns of power in judicial selection. I was not naı̈ve about these standard operating procedures, having lived
through nominations and renominations of lawyers and judges I
counted as colleagues and friends, having studied New York judicial selection as part of my doctoral dissertation, and having commented, lectured, and testified about this selection process for
years.
Yet, I wondered, what if? What if this job ad offered a new way
to recruit judges and Governor Pataki, seeking to add to a legacy
as he mulls over a presidential run, was really employing a creative
approach to attracting new and interesting judges to the bench?
Perhaps Governor Pataki was thinking of innovative ways to diminish the partisan bickering over judges that had become com8. Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y.
2005), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325 (2007). The
Supreme Court granted review of Lopez Torres as this article was going to print.
9. Matter of Spargo, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Mar. 29,
2006, available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/S/spargo.htm.
10. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 21(a).
11. See generally New York State Comm’n on Gov’t Integrity, Becoming a Judge:
Report on the Failings of Judicial Elections in New York State (May 19, 1988), reprinted in New York State Comm’n on Gov’t Integrity, GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S: THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 270 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter Becoming a Judge].
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monplace in Washington and increasingly apparent in the states so
as to present himself to the national electorate as someone who is
willing to forge new ground for the public good. Perhaps Governor Pataki had come to realize that judges, the human representation of justice and the rule of law in a republican form of
government that sets America apart from much of the world, are
different from those selected to serve in the political branches and
should be treated differently than legislators and other political appointees.12 Perhaps he had seen the light and come to understand
that the judiciary should not be a Republican or Democratic issue,
a liberal or conservative issue, but an American issue. Maybe, just
maybe, something different was going on here.
This possibility, that an ambitious political leader might seek distinction by rising above the increasingly harsh and partisan bickering over the role of judges in America and how we should select
them, is appealing. It is well known that judicial selection attracts
inordinate attention from public law scholars and others interested
in the judiciary.13 This attention has only increased over the past
few years as more money flows into judicial campaigns and various
politically ambitious constituencies seem to recognize that public
policy can be affected by state supreme court decision-making.14
During this time, those interested in changing judicial selection
processes worked hard to develop new approaches, such as public
financing of judicial campaigns, improved screening processes for
merit selection, and safeguards for judicial elections.15 Thus, there
is no shortage of possible approaches to change judicial selection.
12. See Luke Bierman, Courts are Different, League of Women Voters of the
United States, League E-Voice Newsletter (Mar. 2006), http://www.lwv.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4751, to
be reprinted in STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2006-2007 (Congressional Quarterly
Press) (forthcoming 2007) (discussing well recognized differences between judges and
other public officials).
13. See, e.g., Philip L. DuBois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of
State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High
Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (chronicling changes in state high
court elections and decision making); Adam Liptak, Case Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2006, at A23 (focusing on Illinois and West Virginia Supreme Court elections); see
also Roy Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, in BACKGROUND
PAPERS FOR FAIR AND INDEPENDENT COURTS: A CONFERENCE ON THE STATE OF
THE JUDICIARY 139, (T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Judith Areon & Lance Liebman eds.,
2006).
15. See generally Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
851 (2002) (discussing merit selection reforms and alternative approaches to ensuring
judicial independence).
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The judicial reform arena lacks political leadership, as there have
been a number of defeats for those advocating change, especially
regarding merit selection.16 After all, disrupting existing patterns
of political power and patronage offers little political payback for
an ambitious political leader.17 But such a leader might receive
some positive attention for tackling this thorny issue in new and
creative ways.
So, on this April 30, with the sun bright and the date reminding
me of the passage of time, I indulged myself and did what many
self-respecting, constitutionally eligible judicial aspirants, facing
the realpolitik of the situation, might not have done: I resolved to
answer the ad in the paper with an application to be a Justice of the
Supreme Court, Third Judicial District, just like any other job.
And believe me, having been rejected for lots of jobs over the
years, I knew a thing or two about applying for jobs, judicial or
otherwise.
II.

JUDGES ARE DIFFERENT, SO WHY DO WE TREAT THEM
THE SAME?

The American republic, an experiment in self governance, was
built upon several principles including democratic representation,
checks and balances, and separation of powers. This latter principle, referred to as an “invaluable precept in the science of politics,”18 posits that there are three separate but equal branches of
government that exercise power according to the processes and
procedures laid out in the Constitution.19 While the first part of
this dogma is explicitly provided for in the Constitution—the three
branches are established and provided areas of authority in the
first three Articles—the precise nature of how power is exercised is
not explicitly stated in our charter20 and remains to this day a work
in progress.21 It is, nonetheless, beyond debate that separation of
16. See id. at 852 (noting merit selection ballot proposal defeats in every county in
Florida).
17. See Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the
New York Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339, 340-41 (1996).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 262 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
19. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 150-61 (1969) (discussing the historical significance of the separation of powers principle).
20. See WOOD, supra note 19, at 604-08.
21. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (holding the independent
counsel does not encroach on the executive’s power because the executive branch
retains sufficient control over the independent counsel to make certain the President
can still perform his constitutional duties); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)
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powers exists as a powerful force in the structure of American government. We may debate the precise contours of that separation
but it undoubtedly exists. Indeed, the Framers characterized the
nature of our federal government as republican in nature,22 and
conceived of separate institutions sharing different powers.23 This
is evident because if we were to vest legislative powers in the executive or vice versa, the principle of separation of powers underlying
our concept of republican government would be invoked to strike
down that configuration.24 This has happened regularly in the
course of our history, which some might see as a tug of war for
primacy between the Congress and the President as reflected in our
current controversies over the extent of executive power.25
As part of the agreement among “We the People,” the Constitution explicitly provides the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, respectively, to Congress, the President, and the Supreme
Court and such other courts as Congress establishes.26 The judicial
power, ceded to an independent, equal branch consisting of courts,
was forged as a check against the potential excesses of the other
branches, for “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers.”27 The selection of federal judges, requiring nomination by the President and
confirmation by the Senate, generally comports with republican
principles that the Framers established in our form of government.28 This methodology for judicial selection offers a benchmark
for a republican form of government against which others must be
measured.
States, no less than the federal government, must comport with
republican principles in establishing and executing their governmental systems.29 Thus, states must comport with the fundamental
tenets of separation of powers, which we know—notwithstanding
(concluding that it is unconstitutional for Congress to reserve for itself the power to
remove an executive officer, in this case the Comptroller General, as that is a power
vested in the executive).
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
23. See generally LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2005).
24. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773-76 (2006) (discussing the
constitutionality of the President enacting military tribunals during times of war).
26. U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; see generally WOOD, supra note 19.
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 413 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS).
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
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that there is no explicit provision recognizing this principle in the
federal constitution—are fundamental to republican principles and
are even explicitly provided for in some state constitutions.30
Faithful to the separation of powers principles, the role of the judiciary in the states, consistent with its role in the federal government, is to serve as a check on the legislature and executive.31
Failing to serve that role in the states, the judiciary would fail to be
the coequal participant in the republican form of government contemplated for the states by Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution.32
The purpose of the check derives from recognizing that legislatures and executives can overextend their influence and infringe on
rights and liberties.33 In other words, unrestrained majorities can
go too far when the legislature and the executive impose their wills
on others in contravention of the greater good as agreed to in a
constitution.34 Under our republican system, applicable to both
the states and the federal government, it is the judiciary, an independent branch of government able to decide cases without fear or
favor, that serves to constrain the majority.35 We know this because, as we have seen, the judicial power exists distinct from the
legislative and executive powers and is granted to the judiciary in
the context of separate institutions exercising different powers.36
As such, the judiciary, and the judges who discharge the judicial
30. See WOOD, supra note 19, at 450-53; see also Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 28-29 (1998).
31. See WOOD, supra note 19, at 453-63; see also Shane, supra note 30, at 21-25.
32. For example, while the legislative power can be exercised by a unicameral
body as in Nebraska, it seems fairly evident that if Nebraska committed legislative,
executive, and judicial functions to that legislature, we would have little difficulty concluding that such a configuration does not satisfy the commonly understood attributes
of a republican form of government as contemplated by constitutional demands. The
Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 261 (“The accumulation of all
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.”). Accordingly, separation of powers as the mechanism for providing opportunities to check the coequal branches is elemental as a sine
qua non of acceptable, indeed constitutional, systems of governance under the contemplation of American forms of republican government. See Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner, The Founders’ Constitution, ch. 10, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/v1ch10I.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
33. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
34. See WOOD, supra note 19, at 602-06.
35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (reinforcing the separation of powers principle).
36. See WOOD, supra note 19, at 453-63.
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power, must be different from the other two branches and those
who discharge legislative and executive powers.
Because judges are public officials with powers different from
legislators and executives, they must be afforded the accoutrements of office that will allow them to succeed in executing their
responsibilities. After all, it is the judicial power that is accorded
to judges, not the legislative or executive power.37 These powers
are different, as are the public officials selected to exercise them.
Legislators must be close to their constituents, hear their concerns,
respond to their wishes, and develop proactive policy agendas that
fulfill those constituents’ expectations. Executives likewise must
be near their constituents so that policies can be implemented in a
manner that responds to the needs of the public. Judges, however,
should be insulated from those demands and pressures so that the
judicial power can be exercised in a manner distinct from the legislative and executive powers.
A key distinguishing characteristic is that judges have some obligation of impartiality, something not expected of legislators or executives, who are selected through popular election precisely
because of their partiality as reflected in their commitments to particular policy choices supported by factions in the electorate.38
Judges acquire legitimacy not through the sword or the purse like
the executive or the legislature, but through their ability to command respect with wise and fair decision-making. Judges must be
free from the politician’s obligations to the public in order to retain
their legitimacy and thus to be able to serve as the necessary and
effective check on an unrestrained majority in the legislature or
executive.39 If the judge has, like the politician, a responsibility to
fulfill the electorate’s expressed preferences, then she is no different from, and serves no different role than, the legislator or executive. The judge in our republican form of government must serve a
very different role.40 As explained by Alexander Hamilton in THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, it is her judgment that promotes respect and
accords legitimacy.41 Think Solomon.
Thus, the judicial process proceeds in ways quite apart from legislative or executive processes. For example, the judicial process
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
38. See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN
THEIR DISTRICTS (1978).
39. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797-804 (2002) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
41. Id.
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follows rules of procedure that are vastly different from legislative
and executive processes, as seen in the rules of evidence, formalities of conduct, and rationales in decision-making. Judges may
only consider certain kinds of evidence, while legislators and executives can assess vast arrays of different kinds and qualities of reports, studies, and opinions. Judges are strictly limited in their
communications to parties before them, in contrast to the extensive
lobbying that characterizes the legislative and executive branches.
Judges are expected to justify their decisions, usually in writing and
consistent with time-worn expectations about following precedent
and format, while legislators and executives are not subject to similar expectations.
To ensure that the judge’s distinct role in a republican government, characterized by separated branches with different responsibilities, is recognized and realized, the judge must be selected by a
means different from the legislator and executive. By distinguishing the selection method, the different roles and responsibilities
can be clarified. Likewise, the functions associated with the different roles and responsibilities of the judge can only be accomplished
if different selection systems are employed. Indeed, using the same
selection systems for the judiciary as those used for the legislature
and executive would serve the purpose of having judges selected
with the same motivations and goals, which do not promote the
judicial functions contemplated by republican government.
Selecting judges through popular electoral processes presents the
distinct likelihood that those judges will perform their duties with
an eye toward the electorate’s expectations, so that the judge as an
electoral candidate gains the support of a sufficient number of voters to be re-elected. Decisions in cases involving highly visible and
contentious issues offer stark choices for judges facing the wrath of
voters, who lack a high level of understanding about the judiciary42
and participate in judicial elections at lower rates than the already
low rates in elections for legislators and executives.43 Moreover, at
42. See A.B.A., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIACOMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 27-28 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY]; see also Becoming a Judge, supra note 11, at 271-88 (discussing
the additional hurdle of attaining party support before the partisan nomination process and the importance of maintaining party and voter support through the re-election process).
43. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 42, at 27-28. Two factors explain minimal participation in judicial elections: low voter turnout and voter “roll-off.” Id. at
28. A number of states report turnout rates below twenty percent. Id. While in voter
“roll-off,” “voters go to the polls and cast ballots for political branch candidates at the
top of the ballot but decline to vote in judicial races at the bottom of the ballot.” Id.
TION
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least some judges themselves believe that accepting campaign contributions affects their rulings.44 Indeed, studies provide credible
evidence that elected judges resolve cases differently as an election
approaches, reflecting decisions that comport with the electorate’s
expectations, akin to how legislators and executives “bring home
the bacon.”45 These factors suggest that elections are antithetical
to the concept of judicial impartiality that underlies the difference
between the political branches and the judiciary in a republican
system of government.
Likewise, voters in judicial elections may act in ways contrary to
our expectations for the judiciary in republican government. Voters typically act retrospectively and review a candidate’s record to
assess the reliability of that person to deliver on the voter’s expectations,46 or look for clues if the candidate’s past provides little information about the likely future rulings of a candidate.47 In
deciding how voters should choose among judicial candidates in an
election, a retrospective analysis is precisely the wrong approach to
apply in a republican form of government when voters select the
public official who must remain independent of expectations and
impartial when making difficult choices. To fulfill their role as a
check in the republican system of government, judges must be free
to function without regard to voters’ expectations and assessments.
The judges must decide without fear or favor, without pandering to
the electorate. If concerns over how voters treat judicial candidates in an upcoming election skew judicial decision-making, the
judicial function is altered, if not entirely debased, to a degree that
compromises the judiciary’s role as an effective check in a republican form of government.
The ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White48 frees judicial candidates from the shackles of traditional judicial ethics
guidelines and permits them to campaign in ways akin to legislative
44. See id. at 25.
45. See generally Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and
Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247 (2004).
This article develops and tests “a theory specifying the conditions under which trial
judges will alter their sentencing behavior to improve their electoral prospects.” Id. at
248.
46. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
47. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN, RICHARD A. BRODY & PHILIP E. TETLOCK, REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 164-78 (1991) (discussing levels of voter information in relation to electoral choice).
48. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that certain restrictions on judicial speech
relating to elections violate the First Amendment).
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and executive candidates. The recent increase in judicial campaign
fundraising and expenditures, and the concomitant decline in civility apparent in judicial campaign practice and rhetoric, reflect the
ominous trend of judicial races becoming more like those of executives and legislators.49 And if political promises, as noted by Justice Scalia in White, are essentially valueless and unbelievable,50
then allowing judges to make those claims places them on the same
footing as legislators and executives. This puts the judiciary in the
same role as the other political branches, which is antithetical to
the judiciary’s role as independent arbiter among the branches as
contemplated by the republican form of government organized
under the Constitution.
In contrast, a judicial selection process without a popular election must comport with republican norms, because the Constitution prescribes presidential nomination and senate confirmation
for the federal judiciary. The federal constitution undoubtedly establishes a republican form of government,51 so states adhering to
the process delineated for federal judicial selection certainly pass
the test. Of course, only a few states mimic the federal process
while the rest employ varying processes.52 Could it be that most
states violate a basic principle of republicanism?53
Notably, at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, no state
elected its judges by popular referendum.54 The great wave of judicial elections arose in the period of Jacksonian Democracy, perhaps to ensure judicial independence by providing judges with
direct authority from, and direct accountability to, the public.55
This approach to judicial selection was preeminent until the Progressive Era when Roscoe Pound and other reformers sought to
49. See generally source cited supra note 27. These are “ominous trends” if one
accepts that “liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 413.
50. See White, 536 U.S. at 780 (stating that political promises are “the least binding
form of human commitment”).
51. See supra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
52. See American Judicature Society Home Page, http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_
stateselect.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2006) (delineating state selection processes).
53. After all, some thirty-nine states use elections to select at least some of their
judges. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 235
(2003 ed., vol. 35).
54. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CROSS-REVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 22, 75-76
(1988).
55. See generally Hall, supra note 4.
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end partisan corrupt judicial elections.56 Today multimillion dollar
judicial campaigns frequently mirror the worst of the legislative
and executive elections. While this observation does not reflect
overt corruption, it undermines the judiciary’s traditional and expected role as a check in the republican form of government.
These multimillion dollar judicial campaigns erode the public’s perception of the judiciary and its functional institutional differences
from the political branches, to the detriment of the functioning of
the republic.57 Shifting away from judicial elections thus makes organizational sense and may even be constitutionally required. But
an ad in the newspaper?
III.

WHAT’S

THE

NEWSPAPER GOT TO DO WITH IT?

Political scientists might say that selecting judges through popular election reflects the pluralist instincts of American life, whereby
many interests come together and compete in the marketplace of
politics for primacy.58 They might also say that selecting judges
through conventions or appointment reflects an elitist approach
that puts decision-making in the hands of a few powerful and often
unaccountable people.59 A newspaper ad recruiting judges, on the
other hand, may reflect an amalgam of interests, offering pluralist
impulses by reaching out to the masses while retaining control in
the hands of the politically powerful. But the curious combination
of selecting judges, some by appointment even if only temporary,
some by election, and some by faux election because the choices
may be limited through cross endorsements, seems vaguely out of
touch with the purposes underlying the judiciary and its place in
the republican system of government with which all states must
comport. I wondered, though, what it would be like if the ad reflected a legitimate and open hiring process and a judge was hired
pursuant to the dynamics of human resources practice, just like any
other job.
First, there would need to be a job description. This task sounds
easy but many law review pages, books, reports, and other efforts
have been expended trying to define the preferred characteristics
of a judge. Of course intelligence, fairness, integrity, temperament,
and many other attributes have been agreed to, but their precise
56. See BELKNAP, supra note 5, at 8-21, 26.
57. See generally JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 42.
58. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979).
59. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
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definitions in this context have proven more difficult to articulate.
Indeed, the changing role of the judicial officer, as trials have become less frequent and decision-making more collaborative,60
might make consensus over the job description even more elusive.
Likewise, as we become more comfortable with the recognition
that judges exercise some policy-oriented responsibilities, the credentials and experiences of the judicial officer may be different
from someone who simply follows principles of stare decisis and
applies rules of procedure while presiding over a trial.61 And even
if we can agree on a job description, who deserves to be in the
hiring process? The public for whom the judge ultimately works?
The governor? The legislature? The bar? A search committee
could be large indeed.
Then, assuming that the job description was agreed upon and
following the appearance of the classified job ad, applications
would follow. The signals provided by a job ad in the classified
section might well promote greater interest in the position, by suggesting that an appointment process other than politics as usual
was underway.62 As letters from applicants arrived, an administrative assistant would compile the files of candidates. No doubt
some would be incomplete, missing the required résumé or cover
letter, and these would be placed in the bottom of the pile. Some
midlevel employee, maybe in the governor’s counsel’s office
(again, who rightfully should be involved in the search process?),
would make a first review of the files, culling out those who clearly
were not qualified constitutionally or professionally. The files
might be organized in order of qualification, with the more experienced and interesting candidates near the top and those with less
compelling credentials and experiences buried below.
Then, a more senior level staffer, the governor’s counsel perhaps
(shouldn’t others with interest in the search be involved in the process?), would review the files of the top candidates, identifying a
short list of five, more or less. Reaching this point might take as
long as several months or as short as a few days, although with this
interim appointment, speed should be a virtue. Phone interviews,
maybe a half hour long, with the top candidates would follow. A
couple of these candidates would be chosen for interviews during
which a list of references would have to be checked. Interviews
60. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 42, at 47-50.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 60-65; see also Becoming a Judge, supra note 11, at 291 (noting the value
of reaching out to nontraditional judicial aspirants).
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with the senior staffer (who are the appropriate members of the
search committee?) would lead to identification of a final candidate who might return for a final interview with the governor
before the job is offered, a nomination is made, and confirmation is
concluded. For jobs of this caliber, the whole process could take
six months or a year. Employment of a search firm might speed
things up a bit, although it could also slow things down. Time
would be of the essence in light of the temporary nature of the
appointment.
In writing this scenario I am struck by the absence of political
party leadership in the process. That absence is a significant deviation from the current judicial selection process, whether elective or
appointive in nature.63 If the judiciary is supposed to differ from
the political branches, it may be reassuring to see that the political
leaders are left out of the scenario posited.64 Under our current
conception of judicial selection in the states, however, such a scenario is, to state it simply, preposterous. Our current debate over
appointment or election does not get us very far toward alternative
models, as we know from both the federal and state experiences
that partisan political factors insinuate themselves in judicial selection processes generally.65 Asking for alternatives that depart from
that paradigm may be asking too much.
At a recent symposium at Fordham Law School, I posited a system of state judicial appointment that is akin to the federal system,
consistent with the dictates of republican principles. I was met
with consternation of a kind usually reserved for those giving long
talks right before the cocktail hour, even though I was proposing
essentially the system that has worked, albeit not without periodic
controversy, for federal judges for almost 225 years.66 More creativity is clearly needed. More openness to new approaches is
needed. Perhaps ads in the newspaper are not the answer to innovation in judicial selection, but we need to think outside the proverbial box. Perhaps we need to pay more attention to the
American Bar Association’s working group on pre-judicial education that looks at how to adapt educational programs and credentialing systems for judicial aspirants to the American traditions of
63. See generally RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS
BENCH AND BAR (1969).
64. See Becoming a Judge, supra note 11, at 277-88 (describing the pervasive nature of partisan leaders in the judicial selection process).
65. See Liptak & Roberts, supra note 14, at A1.
66. See, e.g., GEYH, supra note 1.
OF THE
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judicial selection, thereby melding traditional judicial selection
models within the American tradition with formal academic training.67 Perhaps an internship model, as with the medical profession,
offers some fresh ideas for different models of state judicial selection. What is clear is that we have to pay a bit more attention to
the purposes underlying the judicial branch in a republican form of
government and ask ourselves how to construct selection systems
that comport with those goals if we are to break free of the standard conundrum of appointment or election.
IV. A JOB APPLICATION LIKE ANY OTHER JOB APPLICATION
So, my letter of application for appointment to the interim vacancy in the position of Supreme Court Justice, Third Judicial District, was sent and no doubt filed somewhere, probably lost in some
bureaucracy like Arlo Guthrie’s fingerprints after the Thanksgiving
Day Massacre.68 After all, I am a pretty nontraditional judicial aspirant in the traditional politically-oriented judicial selection process. As I write and edit this Essay, almost six months after
sending the letter of application, I have heard nothing.69 I guess I
shouldn’t be surprised. Jobs are not typically filled quickly—six
months is nothing when applying for a job. In this way, I guess the
classified ad approach to recruit judges is like any other job. And
we should not be treating a judgeship like any other job because in
our system of republican government the judiciary is different.

67. A white paper is available from the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. See generally A.B.A. Study Group on Pre-Judicial
Education, Report of the Study Group on Pre-Judicial Education (Feb. 12, 2005) (on
file with author).
68. ARLO GUTHRIE, Alice’s Restaurant Massacre, on ALICE’S RESTAURANT
(Warner Bros. 1967).
69. And apparently no other applicants heard anything either. No appointment
has been made and the Third Judicial District Nominating Conventions recently met
and cross endorsed a Democratic lawyer with long family ties to the Albany County
Democratic Party for the Spargo vacancy. Carol DeMare, Judge Hopefuls Get GOP
Backing, ALB. TIMES UNION, Sept. 26, 2006, at B1.
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